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I study battles between short sellers and firms. Firms use a variety of methods to impede short
selling, including legal threats, investigations, lawsuits, and various technical actions intended to
create a short squeeze. These actions create short sale constraints. Consistent with the hypothesis
that short sale constraints allow stocks to be overpriced, firms taking anti-shorting actions have in
the subsequent year very low abnormal returns of about -2 percent per month.
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owen.lamont@yale.eduShort sale constraints can allow stocks to be overpriced.  Constraints include various 
costs and risks, such as the expense and difficulty of borrowing stock, legal and institutional 
restrictions, and the risk that the short position will have to be involuntarily closed due to recall 
of the stock loan.  If these impediments prevent investors from sufficiently shorting certain 
stocks, these stocks can be overpriced and thus have low future returns until the overpricing is 
corrected.  By identifying stocks with particularly high short sale constraints, one can identify 
stocks with particularly low future returns.  These constraints are difficult to measure, however, 
and researchers have struggled to find appropriate data to test the overpricing hypothesis. 
In this paper, I test whether overpricing increases when firms deliberately raise the level 
of short sale constraints.  Firms can take a variety of actions to impede short selling of their 
stock.  Firms take legal and regulatory actions to hurt short sellers, such as accusing them of 
crimes, suing them, hiring private investigators to probe them, and requesting that the authorities 
investigate their activities.  Firms take technical actions to make shorting difficult, such as splits 
or distributions specifically designed to disrupt short selling.  Firms can coordinate with 
shareholders to withdraw shares from the stock lending market, thus preventing short selling by 
causing loan recall.  These battles between short sellers and firms can be extraordinarily 
acrimonious.  The following statement from the sample used in this paper gives a flavor of 
attitudes toward short sellers: "Your activities are mean, shameful and loathsome. They are 
motivated by appalling avarice and greed, and they will not be permitted to go unanswered." 
(Fulman, 1998) 
An example of the various anti-shorting strategies used by firms is provided by Solv-Ex, 
a firm that claimed to have technology for economically extracting crude oil from tar-laden sand.  
Short sellers claimed that Solv-Ex was a fraud.  On 2/5/96, the management of Solv-Ex faxed a 
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 letter to brokers and shareholders: “To help you control the value of your investment…we 
suggest that you request delivery of the Solv-Ex certificates from your broker as soon as 
possible.”  (Weiss, 1996).  This suggestion, entirely legal on the part of Solv-Ex, was essentially 
an attempt at market manipulation.  The letter was an attempt to orchestrate a short squeeze 
using the stock lending system (the mechanics of stock lending are described further in section 
I). 
Any shareholder heeding Solv-Ex’s suggestion would have withdrawn his shares from 
the stock lending market, potentially forcing short sellers to cover their positions.  On 2/2/96, 
before the letter, Solv-Ex’s price was at $24.875.  By 2/21/96, the price had risen to $35.375, 
perhaps due to Solv-Ex’s attempted squeeze.  Solv-Ex took other action against short sellers as 
well.  Later in 1996, Solv-Ex said that it had hired private investigators to find out who was 
spreading misinformation about the firm, and subsequently it filed suit against a well-known 
short seller, claiming he had spread false information.  However, in this case it was Solv-Ex 
which was engaged in illegal activities, not the short sellers.  Solv-Ex delisted at 7/1/97 at $4.25,  
it entered Chapter 11 bankruptcy in 1997, and in 2000 the court ruled that the firm had indeed 
defrauded investors. 
In this case, the evidence is consistent with the idea that Solv-Ex was overpriced in 
February 1996, since it subsequently fell sharply.  This paper looks at long-term returns for a 
sample of 266 similar firms who threaten, take action against, or accuse short sellers of illegal 
activities or false statements.  The sample is constructed using publicly observable actions from 
news reports and firm press releases.   
It turns out that (as in the Solv-Ex case) sample firms have very low returns in the year 
subsequent to taking anti-shorting action.  Abnormal returns are approximately -2 percent per 
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 month.  While this degree of underperformance may seem implausibly large, it is in line with 
other estimates from Jones and Lamont (2002), Lamont and Thaler (2003), and Ofek, 
Richardson, and Whitelaw (2003).   Thus the evidence is consistent with the idea that short sale 
constraints allow very substantial overpricing, and that this overpricing gets corrected only 
slowly over many months.  As a secondary issue, this paper also examines the behavior of short 
interest and prices around anti-shorting actions. There is weak evidence at best that deliberate 
short squeezes can temporarily raise stock prices. 
The idea that short sale constraints can prevent negative information or opinions from 
being expressed in stock prices comes from Miller (1977).  Although constraints are necessary in 
order for mispricing to occur, they are not sufficient.  Constraints can explain why a rational 
arbitrageur fails to short the overpriced security, but not why anyone buys the overpriced 
security.  To explain that, one needs investors who are willing to buy overpriced stocks.  Thus 
two things, trading costs and some investors with downward sloping demand curves, are 
necessary for substantial mispricing.  This willingness to hold overpriced stocks can be 
interpreted either as reflecting irrational optimism by some investors, or rational speculative 
behavior reflecting differences of opinion.  I discuss the underlying theory more in section I.  
This paper is organized as follows.  Section I discusses the general issues of short sale 
constraints and reviews related research.  Section II describes how the sample was constructed.  
Section III describes the sample characteristics.  Section IV examines long run returns for sample 
stocks.  Section VI examines shorting costs and short interest around anti-shorting events.  
Section VI looks at short term price movements around attempted short squeezes.  Section VII 
summarizes and presents conclusions. 
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 I.  Background and literature review 
A.  Mechanics of shorting stock 
To be able to sell a stock short, one must borrow it, and because borrowing shares is not 
done in a centralized market, finding shares can sometimes be difficult or impossible.  In order to 
borrow, an investor needs to find an institution or individual willing to lend.  These lenders 
receive a daily lending fee from the borrowers, determined by supply and demand in the lending 
market.   
Brokers have the ability to lend shares of their customers, provided customers have given 
written permission.  Once a short seller has initiated a position by borrowing stock, the borrowed 
stock may be recalled at any time by the lender.  If the short seller is unable to find another 
lender, he is forced to close his position.  This possibility leads to recall risk, one of many risks 
that short sellers face. 
There are several reasons that a shareholder might initially refuse to lend stock, or might 
later withdraw his shares from the stock lending market.  First, if the lender sells his stock, he 
must recall his stock loan so that he can deliver his shares to the buyer.  Second, in some unusual 
cases (which are studied here), firms devise technical actions which force shareholders not to 
lend.  For example, one firm required shareholders to send their stock certificates to the firm's 
transfer agent in order to receive a distribution.  An owner cannot send in the certificate unless he 
is in physical possession of it.  Third, shareholders may refuse to lend their stock because they 
fear that by helping short sellers, they will be helping drive stock prices down.  This idea (the 
basis of the Solv-Ex example) obviously makes no sense in a competitive market where no 
individual investor is big enough to affect prices.  Fourth, for individual investors, brokers 
typically only have the ability to lend out of margin accounts, not cash accounts.  Fifth, some 
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 institutions do not have stock lending programs at all, perhaps because the income generated by 
lending would not be enough to compensate for the fixed cost of setting up a lending program. 
Generally, it is easy and cheap to borrow most large cap stocks, but it can be difficult to 
borrow stocks which are small, have low institutional ownership, or which are in high demand 
for borrowing.  A somewhat paradoxical description of the stock lending market is that it usually 
works very well, except when you want to use it, in which case it works terribly.  By this I mean 
that it can be difficult or expensive to short stocks that many people believe are overpriced and 
many people want to short.  Of course, this point is the essence of the overpricing hypothesis: 
stocks are only overpriced when informed investors are unable or unwilling to short them.  No 
one would want to short them if they weren’t overpriced, and they wouldn’t be overpriced if they 
weren’t hard to short. 
Since the data collection strategy is based on public anti-shorting actions taken by firms 
(and in the case of lawsuits depends on firms being able to identify short sellers), it is useful to 
consider the conflicting incentives for secrecy faced by short sellers.  Short sellers sometimes 
attempt to remain anonymous, while other times publicize their activities.  On the one hand, 
when shorting a stock, one has the incentive to publicize the opinion that the stock is overpriced.  
The sooner one can convince other investors that the stock price is too high, the sooner the price 
will fall, minimizing holding costs and price risk. 
On the other hand, recall risk, and more generally the cost of maintaining a short position, 
gives short sellers an incentive for secrecy, since holding costs generally rise when other 
investors are also trying to short.  For stocks that are hard to short, a short seller would like the 
stock price to go down, but he may not want other people to short the stock.  The cost and 
difficulty of shorting is determined by supply and demand in the securities lending market.  If 
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 more people try to short a stock, the cost of shorting might rise and existing stock loans may be 
called in by the stock lender.  In addition, secrecy might be preferred if the short seller wants to 
avoid being sued or harassed by the firm he is shorting.  
B.  Other short sale constraints 
In addition to the problems in the stock lending market, there are a variety of other short 
sale constraints.  US equity markets are not set up to make shorting easy.  Regulations and 
procedures administered by the SEC, the Federal Reserve, the various stock exchanges, 
underwriters, and individual brokerage firms can mechanically impede short selling.  Legal and 
institutional constraints inhibit investors from selling short.   For example, Almazan et al. (2000) 
find that only about thirty percent of mutual funds are allowed to sell short, and only two percent 
actually do sell short.  
In addition to regulations, short sellers also face hostility from society at large.  Policy 
makers and the general public seem to have an instinctive reaction that short selling is morally 
wrong.  Short selling is characterized as inhuman, unAmerican, and against God (Proverbs 
24:17: "Do not rejoice when your enemy falls, and do not let your heart be glad when he 
stumbles.").  Hostility is not limited to America.  In Malaysia in 1995, the Finance Ministry 
proposed mandatory caning as the punishment for short sellers (the beating "will be light, similar 
to the punishment carried out on juveniles") (Jayasankaran, 1995). 
Short sellers face periodic waves of harassment from governments and society, usually in 
times of crisis or following major price declines as short sellers are blamed.  Short sellers are 
often thought to be in league with America’s enemies.  The general idea seems to be that short 
selling is bad, and when bad things happen (such as war) it probably involves short sellers in 
some way.  For example, the New York Stock Exchange imposed special short selling 
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 regulations during World War I (in November 1917), in response to both a substantial market 
decline and a fear that the Kaiser would send enemy agents to drive down stock prices.  Jones 
and Lamont (2001) and Jones (2002) discuss another historical episode following the crash of 
1929.  This historical pattern has continued in recent years, following both the terrorist attack of 
September 11, 2001 and the more general market fall starting in 2000.  Media reports indicate 
that authorities in Britain and Japan have sought to discourage shorting.  
C.  Overpricing: Theory 
  Harrison and Kreps (1978) construct a model with rational investors where differences 
of opinion, together with short sale constraints, create a “speculative premium” in which stock 
prices are higher than even the most optimistic investor’s assessment of their value (see also 
Duffie et al, 2002).  These differences of opinion can be interpreted as arising from different 
prior beliefs which rationally converge as information arrives (Morris 1996), or as irrational 
overconfidence (Scheinkman and Xiong, 2003).  In any case, short sale constraints generate a 
pattern of overpricing leading to subsequent low returns.    
  Here I give an example that illustrates Harrison and Kreps (1978).  In the model of Miller 
(1977) short sale constraints cause stock prices to reflect only the views of the optimists.  The 
Harrison and Kreps (1978) story goes beyond Miller (1977) to say that the stock can be priced 
even higher than the most optimistic assessment of its true value.  In their model, everybody 
agrees that stocks are overpriced but are still willing to hold stocks.   
Suppose investor A and investor B have different beliefs about the prospects for a risky 
asset.  Each one knows what the other one believes, but they agree to disagree, so there is no 
asymmetric information.  Assume a simple set up with three dates, date 0, 1, and 2, and for 
simplicity assume risk neutral agents behaving competitively, a discount rate of zero, and there 
Go down fighting – Page 7 
 are sufficient numbers of type A and type B investors for each type to hold all the asset by 
themselves.  Suppose it is currently date 0, and both A and B believe that the asset is worth 200 
today.  Specifically, they both believe that at date 2 it will be worth 300 with 50% probability 
and 100 with 50% probability.  However, A thinks that at date 1 some news will arrive that will 
resolve all uncertainty, while B thinks there will be no relevant news released until date 2.  This 
belief about when news gets released is the only disagreement between A and B (it is not 
necessary to state who, if either, is right in their beliefs).  The Harrison and Kreps (1978) model 
has the remarkable property that in the presence of short sale constraints, both A and B would be 
willing to hold the asset at 250 at date 0, despite the fact they both think it is only worth 200.   
To get to this result, work backward from date 1, using the principle that with short sale 
constraints the optimist always sets the price.  At date 1, if good news has arrived then A will 
value the asset 300 while B still thinks it is worth 200, thus the price will be 300 (A will hold all 
the asset, B will hold none of it).  If bad news arrives at date 1, the price will be 200 (B will hold 
all of it).  Since these two states happen with 50-50 probability, the date 0 expected price for date 
1 is 250.  Thus at date 0, both A and B are willing to hold the asset at a price of 250.  Although 
everyone thinks it is overvalued at date 0, they are willing to buy at date 0 because they believe 
they are following a dynamic trading strategy that will take advantage of the other investor.  This 
example formalizes the notion of the “greater fool” theory of asset pricing. Note that everyone 
agrees that long-term expected returns between date 0 and date 2 are low (as the value is 
expected to fall from 250 to 200), and thus a buy and hold strategy is a bad idea.  Volume is a 
key part of the story.  Since everyone is following a dynamic trading strategy, you see lots of 
trading at date 1 as traders try to take advantage of one another.  Without volume, there would be 
no overpricing.  
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 D.  Overpricing: Evidence 
A variety of empirical evidence confirms the prediction that binding short sale constraints 
lead to low returns, although much of the evidence is circumstantial because it is hard to observe 
the level of short sale constraints for different stocks.  Looking across stocks, the prediction is 
that when constraints bind more tightly, subsequent returns will be lower.  One can test this 
hypothesis either by finding stocks with higher constraints (if constraints vary across stocks), or 
finding stocks with higher unexpressed shorting demand (if the demand for shorting varies 
across stocks).  The basic idea of looking at shorting demand is that some investors want to short 
a stock but are impeded by constraints, thus the stock is overpriced.  If one can estimate the size 
of this group of investors, one can measure the extent of overpricing.  In practice measures of 
shorting constraints and shorting demand tend to be highly correlated, since both are reflecting 
the same mechanism that constraints prevent informed investors from immediately correcting 
overpricing. 
One measure of short sale constraints is the cost of shorting reflected in the stock loan 
market.  A variety of recent papers study the market for borrowing stock (D’Avolio (2002), 
Geczy et al. (2002), Mitchell et al. (2002), Ofek and Richardson (2003), and Reed (2001)), 
unfortunately using sample periods of short duration.  Jones and Lamont (2002), using a longer 
sample of shorting costs, show that stocks that are expensive to short or that enter the lending 
market have high valuations and low subsequent returns.  Indirect costs of shorting can come 
from options as in Figlewski and Webb (1993), Sorescu (2000), Lamont and Thaler (2003), 
Ofek, Richardson, and Whitelaw (2003). 
Proxies for shorting demand include breadth of ownership (Chen, Hong, and Stein 
(2002)), dispersion of beliefs (Diether, Malloy, and Scherbina, 2002), or the level of short 
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 interest (Figlewski (1981), Figlewski and Webb (1993), and Dechow et al. (2001)).  
Unfortunately, using short interest as a proxy for shorting demand is problematic, because the 
quantity of shorting represents the intersection of supply and demand.  The quantity of shorting 
should respond to both the cost and benefit of shorting the stock, so that stocks that are very 
costly to short will have low short interest.  Stocks that are impossible to short have an infinite 
shorting cost, yet the level of short interest is zero.  Lamont and Thaler (2003), for example, 
examine a sample of technology carve-outs that appear to be overpriced.  In one case they study, 
the apparent overpricing and the implied cost of shorting fall over time, while the level of short 
interest rises.  Thus short interest can be negatively correlated with shorting demand, 
overpricing, and shorting costs.  The problematic nature of short interest leads to weak empirical 
results.   
E.  Reaction to news 
Another strand of literature looks at the reaction of prices to news about short sales. In 
rational models such as Diamond and Verrecchia (1987), informed investors sell short, but once 
short interest is announced stock prices should immediately adjust to take into account the 
negative information.  Consistent with this idea, Aitken et al. (1998) find that stock prices fall 
immediately in response to announced increases in short interest. 
The anti-shorting actions studied here might reveal something both about the presence of 
informed pessimists, and the information possessed by the firm.  For example, perhaps only 
firms that believe themselves to be overpriced engage in anti-shorting actions, since underpriced 
firms know that the market will eventually recognize their true worth.  As in the Solv-Ex case, 
empirically many firms accuse short sellers of fraud, but are in fact themselves guilty of fraud 
(“The lady doth protest too much, methinks.”  Hamlet. Act iii. Sc. 2.).   One short seller in the 
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 sample noted “we can look at a company that is attacking us. When we have the goods on that 
company, it tells us we are onto something. The louder they scream, the better the short.” 
(Pender, 1989) 
While the information revealed by anti-shorting actions is an interesting topic, it isn’t 
explored here.  Rather, the hypothesis tested is whether anti-shorting actions lead to predictable 
low returns.  Under the hypothesis of efficient markets with no frictions, prices should 
immediately adjust to new information, and post-event returns should be unpredictable.  The 
empirical question studied here is not reaction to news, but rather long-term returns based on 
lagged public information. 
II.  Constructing the sample 
I searched Lexis, Dow Jones Interactive, and other text sources for episodes featuring 
reported disputes between short sellers and firms, ending in June 2002.  These sources contained 
newspaper and magazine articles, newswire items, transcripts of broadcast media, and press 
releases.  “Firms” were in most cases firm management, but in a few cases were large 
shareholders of the firm.  I searched on key words such as “short seller”, “lawsuit,” 
“conspiracy,” and so on.  Finding the relevant events was a time-consuming and labor-intensive 
process that involved reading several thousand pages of text.  Coding the events sometimes 
required judgment calls, and information was often incomplete or ambiguous.   
I find 327 events from 266 different firms, the earliest event in March 1977, and the latest 
in May 2002.  Media coverage is thinner in earlier years, and 77% of the events occur after 1990.  
In addition to events, I also have (up to June 2002) returns, market equity, and volume from 
CRSP, book values from Compustat, and short interest from the NYSE (from 1992 to 2001) and 
NASDAQ (from 1995 to 2001).  To get in the sample, a firm must be common stock in CRSP 
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 with data available within the first 12 months after the event (this excludes OTCBB stocks, 
which are the source of many extraordinary anti-shorting episodes).  I exclude cases involving 
merger arbitrage or convertible securities arbitrage. 
The sample includes events where the firm mounts some sort of defense against short 
sellers, or accuses short sellers of wrongdoing (and thus implicitly raise the threat of legal 
action).  The sample includes nine types of events, sorted into three categories.  The first 
category is belligerent statements about short sellers, ranging from threats of legal action to 
detailed refutations of short seller’s claims.  The second category is taking legal or regulatory 
action against short sellers.  The third category is taking technical action to prevent short selling.  
Table I lists the different events types of events. 
A.  Belligerent statements 
The first category, belligerent statements, is when the firm claims that short sellers are 
acting improperly to cause the stock price to go down.  I include in this category cases when the 
firm expends some effort refuting or denouncing short sellers, but falls short of taking specific 
actions. Belligerent statements often contain explicit or implicit threats of legal action against 
short sellers.  Although belligerent statements themselves do not impede short sellers, they do 
indicate a greater likelihood that the firm will take some anti-shorting action in the future.  
Belligerent statements include any case in which firms explicitly accuse the short sellers of 
making illegal or improper actions, or disseminating false information.  I exclude from the 
database cases where the firm mentioned short sellers but did not accuse them of improper 
action.   
Belligerent statements come in three types.  The first is when the firm claims some sort of 
conspiracy by short sellers, and includes claims of illegal shorting or stock price manipulation.  
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 A typical statement is “We continue to firmly believe that ...stakeholders have been victimized 
by stock manipulators.”  (Knight, 1998)  This category also includes claims that short sellers 
were harassing or manipulating customers, investors, or suppliers.  
The second type (which was often difficult to distinguish from the first) was the claim the 
short sellers were spreading misinformation about the firm.  Typical cases claimed lies, rumors, 
or planting negative stories in the media.  To get into the database, firms had to either explicitly 
discuss the role of short sellers in spreading these lies, or to be rebutting someone who was 
publicly acknowledged to be shorting the stock.   A typical statement is “These false rumors 
regarding both the company and its products have been spread by short sellers of the company's 
stock.” (System Software Associates Inc., 1995)  
Third, firms state they are considering their legal options and thus threaten potential legal 
action against short sellers or critics.  A typical statement is “The Board of Directors has directed 
legal counsel to protect the Company's integrity and reputation and they will be assessing the 
legal remedies which the Company may pursue.” (Quigley Corporation, 1997)  This category 
also includes cases where the firm states they are undertaking their own investigation of short 
sellers, including hiring outside counsel or hiring private investigators.   
B.  Legal actions 
I break legal or regulatory actions into two types of events.  The first is when firms publicly 
announce that they are requesting an investigation by regulatory authorities, usually the relevant 
exchange or the SEC.  This category also includes cases where the firm claims the SEC is 
already investigating short sellers.  It is sometimes the case that when short sellers claim the SEC 
is investigating the firm for accounting shenanigans, the firm will respond by claiming that the 
SEC is investigating the short sellers for price manipulation.   
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 This category also contained five cases when the media (as opposed to the firm) reports 
that the SEC or exchange actually are investigating short sellers.  Although not every case 
reveals that the firm alleged wrongdoing, in each of the cases the reports occur after other anti-
shorting activities by the firm.  It seems reasonable to infer that the firm complained to 
regulators.  This category also includes eight cases involving 1989 Congressional hearings about 
short selling.  Media reports indicated that the hearings were initiated by disgruntled firms (these 
hearings are discussed further in Section VII). 
The second type of legal action is lawsuits initiated by the firm or by shareholders against 
short sellers or critics.  Sometimes these lawsuits were against short sellers or brokers, and 
sometimes against media outlets or analysts.  Of the 35 lawsuits, 7 were “cybersmear” lawsuits 
involving electronic postings by unknown persons.  These lawsuits usually speculated that the 
posters were short sellers: “In its libel suit, Hollis-Eden alleges the defendants, named only by 
their screen aliases, could be disgruntled former employees and shareholders or people working 
with short sellers to manipulate the stock.” (Crabtree, 2001)  
C.  Technical actions 
Firms can make it difficult to short their stock by disrupting the ability to borrow shares.  
One technical action taken by firms in the sample was to switch stock exchanges from the 
NASDAQ to AMEX or NYSE.  For much of the sample period, NASDAQ was perceived as 
being more lax in its short selling rules (it did not adopt the uptick rule until 1994).  The sample 
includes six firms announcing that they were changing or applying to change exchanges 
explicitly to impede short selling (event dates range from 1988 to 1996).   
  Second, as in the example of Solv-Ex (discussed in the introduction), 29 firms urge or 
suggest that shareholders collectively withdraw their shares from the stock lending market. A 
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 prominent example is Irwin Jacobs, an investor who owned 5% of Conseco.  In July 2000 he 
waged a personal campaign against short sellers, spending $400,000 for full-page ads in the New 
York Times and Wall Street Journal, calling on fellow shareholders to take their shares "in-
house." (02/19/2001 Forbes).
1 
  Third, firms attempt in a variety of ways to get shares into the hands of friendly owners, 
who presumably will not lend their shares.  I classify 7 events of this type, and they include a 
number of loosely related actions.  Again, all require that the stated action be explicitly in 
response to short sellers or taking place within the context of a battle with short sellers.  Two are 
when the CEO of the firm announces that he is setting up an entity to buy and sell firm shares, 
using his own personal money.  Three are when the firm announces it is repurchasing its own 
shares (I require that the announcement specifically mention short sellers).  One is when it is 
announced that a large shareholder is withdrawing his shares from the lending market.  One is 
when a firm announces that the employee stock ownership plan is acquiring shares.  A last is 
when a firm offers to lend money to its shareholders to replace margin loans, so that the 
shareholders can place their stock in cash accounts (brokers typically can lend shares of their 
customers in margin accounts but not cash accounts).   
  The last category contains miscellaneous trading-related actions to impede short selling.  
There are six cases where firms do splits or distributions which are apparently designed to force 
short sellers to close out their positions.  For example, one firm required holders to send their 
stock certificates to the firm's transfer agent to be eligible to receive a stock dividend.  Another 
firm did what was effectively a 1.1 for 1 stock split, with the same intention.   
In three other cases, firms initiated trading halts explicitly in response to short sellers.  
The policy of the New York Stock Exchange is that firms should warn the NYSE ten minutes 
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 prior to major announcements, and sometimes the NYSE halts trading for a brief period, often 10 
or 20 minutes, while the information is disseminated.  One of these cases is described by Asensio 
(2001).  After Asensio (a short-seller) had released a negative report on a firm, the firm informed 
the NYSE that a major announcement was forthcoming and trading stopped at 10.44 am.  
Trading did not finally resume until 3.52 pm, eight minutes before the exchange closed, and in 
those eight minutes the price rose.  According to Asensio, “someone had done a helluva job 
rallying the troops...By that time the institutions had galvanized enough buyers to run up the 
stock.”  The firm did not make a major announcement, but only released a press release 
denouncing Asensio. 
D.  Limitations of the database 
The database is surely an incomplete record of anti-shorting action taken by firms.  First, 
it does not reflect private anti-shorting actions, such as private lawsuit threats made by firms.  
Many events only appear in the sample because they are deemed interesting or newsworthy.  It is 
undoubtedly the case that many anti-short selling actions do not get into the database because 
they are not reported in the media.  As a result, the database is only a partial reflection of reality, 
and in particular it is likely that when firms take multiple actions, only some of them are 
reflected in the database.  Coverage is particularly incomplete in the early years of the sample. 
Some firms appear multiple times in the database since they took multiple actions.  For 
this reason, the totals in the rightmost column of Table I are not always the sum of the individual 
categories.  My coding strategy is to stop collecting belligerent statements on the first date that 
technical or legal events take place, so by construction the sample contains no belligerent 
statements after a legal or technical event.  Probably many of the firms making belligerent 
statement subsequently take technical/legal actions that are not reflected in the database because 
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 they are not reported in the media.  In addition, in each subcategory I collect only the first event 
and so subsequent instances are ignored. 
E.  Excluded cases 
I exclude a variety of other forms of harassment of short sellers and suppression of 
criticism, since these anti-shorting actions were difficult to systematically classify.  These cases 
range from the farcical to the tragic. 
According to sworn testimony, Charles Keating Jr. (of the famous Keating Five) wanted 
to buy every copy of Forbes magazine sold near branches of his Lincoln Savings, because the 
magazine contained critical comments (The Dallas Morning News, 1991).  In other cases, firms 
attempt to prevent short sellers from asking questions at conference calls or annual meetings.  In 
one case, when a short seller tried to ask a question at the annual meeting of Cineplex Odeon, he 
was drowned out by a “prolonged and very loud coughing fit” which made his question inaudible  
(Hubbard, 1990).  Both Keating’s firm and Cineplex are included in the sample because of other 
reported incidents. 
There are various reports of short sellers (and sometimes journalists or analysts) receiving 
death threats, requiring bodyguards, and arming themselves.  In at least one case, someone may 
have been killed because of short selling.  The case involves Tel-Com Wireless Cable TV, whose 
official spokesperson was Ivana Trump.  On 12/14/1998, Barron’s reported that “several terrified 
investors told Barron's and the police that their families had been threatened by convicted 
criminals who accused the investors of selling short” (the firm gets in the sample, not because of 
this accusation, but because of the firm’s subsequent rebuttal).  A year later, 11/01/1999 , 
Barron’s reported that one of the threatened individuals had been found murdered, execution-
style, in Colts Neck, New Jersey. 
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 The sample includes only explicit anti-shorting actions.  I exclude from the sample some 
events which seemed to be anti-shorting but where the participants denied trying to hurt short 
sellers.  For example, octogenarian potato tycoon J.R. Simplot was a major shareholder of 
Micron Tech, and also controlled an unrelated firm, the J.R. Simplot Company.  He offered to 
his workers at Simplot the following employee benefit: "Mr. Simplot will make whole any loss" 
on Micron shares they buy (essentially giving employees a put option as long as they bought 
shares)  (Lowenstein, 1989).  Although it was speculated in the press that this was intended to 
hurt short sellers (by increasing share prices and putting more shares into friendly hands), the 
J.R. Simplot Company denied this allegation. 
In addition to the public manipulation of the stock loan market discussed previously, 
there are also allegations of private manipulation by institutional owners.  One such accusation 
(Browning, 1996) is that Fidelity Investments deliberately withdrew its shares of Chesapeake 
Energy from the stock loan market in order to drive up the price.  Fidelity denied this allegation. 
An extreme example of stock loan manipulation the “corner”.  Suppose B borrows shares 
from A and sells them short.  Now A acquires 100 percent of the shares (or at least 100 percent 
available in the market) of the stock and demands that B return the shares.  In this case the only 
way B can return the shares is to buy them (at an inflated price) from A.  Corners probably 
occurred (in US equity markets) more frequently in the late 19
th and early 20
th century, a 
prominent late case being the Stutz Motor corner of 1920 (Meeker, 1932).  Two recent cases in 
the US occurred in the late 1980’s.  The president of Southland Communications was tried and 
convicted for driving his stock price up by cornering the firm's stock through secret trades 
(Lansner, 1998).  In another case, the SEC determined that two individuals had orchestrated a 
corner in Chase Medical and that they controlled 109% of the public float (Siconolfi, 1989).  
Go down fighting – Page 18 
 Neither of these cases are reflected in the sample since they were not public anti-shorting actions.    
III.  Characteristics of the sample 
Table II shows the characteristics of the 266 firms in the sample.  It shows the 
characteristics of the firms in the month prior to the month in which the first event takes place.  
For example, in the “all events” row, the statistics are for the month end preceding the first event, 
even if multiple events take place.  The table shows the percentile ranking of the variable relative 
to all stocks in CRSP in the same month.  
Looking first at size, the average ranking for all events is 67 percent, so that event firms 
are above median relative to the universe of firms in CRSP.  This characteristic may reflect the 
fact that larger firms are more newsworthy.  Market-book ratios show that event firms are growth 
firms, since they are in the upper quartile of valuation.  Strikingly, event firms have very high 
trading volume in the month before the event (trading volume is measured as share turnover 
relative to other stocks on the same exchange).  Part of this high volume of 87 percentile may 
reflect information released around the event date.  However, 12 months before the event month, 
it is still the case that event firms have percentile turnover of 77 percent.  One interpretation is 
that volume proxies for differences in opinion (agents trade when they disagree), and thus these 
are firms where investors have very dispersed opinions.  Under short sale constraints, high 
volume may predict low future returns (see for example Diether 2004).  Looking at pre-event 
returns, the differences are less dramatic.  Prior one year returns are slightly above median and 
prior month returns are about the same as the median stock.  Thus events do not seem to be 
triggered by extreme stock price movements at the monthly or yearly level.  Last, looking at the 
ratio of short interest to shares outstanding, it is not surprising to see that immediately prior to 
the event, firms have very high short interest relative to the other stocks. 
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 In summary, event firms are high volume, high short interest, growth firms of above 
median size. 
IV.  Long run returns 
A.  Event time returns 
Under the overpricing hypothesis, post-event returns should be low.  Table III shows monthly 
returns subsequent to the event, for different time horizons.  It shows event time returns with a 
very simple risk-adjustment procedure: returns are market-adjusted by subtracting out the return 
on the CRSP value weighted index (later I show calendar time returns with different risk 
adjustments).  The table shows average monthly returns earned by buying the event stock on the 
last day of the month in which the event is publicly observed.  Thus it measures post-event long-
term performance. 
  First looking at the all event, one year cell, Table III shows that event firms have very 
low returns.
2   In the twelve months subsequent to any event, firms have returns that are a 
whopping 2.34 percent per month lower than the market, and this difference is highly statistically 
significant.  In terms of the magnitude, the two percent per month is in the same ballpark as the 
large estimates found in other cases of extreme short sale constraints.  Jones and Lamont (2002) 
found that highly constrained firms had abnormal returns of -1 percent per month in the year 
subsequent to becoming constrained, for the period 1926-1933.  Lamont and Thaler (2003) find 
abnormal returns of -10 percent per month over an approximately six month period for a sample 
of six cases involving short sale constraints, for the period 1998-2001.  Ofek, Richardson, and 
Whitelaw (2003) find abnormal returns of about -2 percent per month for a sample of short sale 
constrained stocks, for the period 1999-2002. 
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   Looking now at the different time horizons, two facts emerge.  First, the low returns are 
highly persistent, and continue for years.  In the 36 months after any event, the market adjusted 
returns are -1.48 percent per month, so that the cumulative fall is 42 percent.  The last column 
shows that, even after excluding the first year (so that the sample is firms which had an event in 
the past three years but not in the last year), market adjusted returns are a substantial -0.89 
percent per month.  While this number has a t-statistic that is less than two, partially because the 
sample contains fewer observations since many have gone bankrupt or been delisted, it is 
economically large.   Thus the time pattern is consistent with overpricing that is only slowly 
corrected through time.  The effect is not primarily a short-term under-reaction to bad news that 
gets quickly corrected.  Rather, it is a long-term overpricing phenomenon, with time pattern 
similar to the value effect. 
Second, it is clear that the returns are lowest immediately after the event, and gradually 
the effect weakens over time.  Thus there is no evidence in Table III to support the idea that one 
should buy stocks after an event occurs, in anticipation of a short squeeze (Section VI examines 
in more detail a subset of these events, and look at daily returns around event dates).  
  Looking across the different types of events, there does not seem to be much difference in 
mean returns.  In drawing inferences about the effect of short sale constraints, the legal and 
technical categories may be more reliable, since the belligerent statement category is somewhat 
more ambiguous.  Belligerent statements are just cheap talk, and require more researcher 
judgment to define the event.  In contrast, technical and legal events are tangible actions.  Since 
all three categories of events predict large and statistically significant underperformance of 
returns in the subsequent year, it is not necessary to use the belligerent category to draw 
inferences about the effect of events.  Even excluding belligerent statements, there is strong 
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 evidence that anti-shorting events are followed by very low returns.  In regressions not shown, 
there is no statistically significant difference in returns between the three classes of events 
(belligerent, legal, and technical).  Measurement error may be responsible for some of these 
similarities, since some belligerent firms probably also take unobserved legal or technical 
actions.  Since there are not detectable differences between the categories, the rest of the paper 
discusses the “all events” row only. 
The effect is robust to different methods.  First, the calculations in Table III include the 
effects of delisting returns: 30 of the 266 firms delist in the twelve months after the event.  
Excluding these delisting returns, the average market adjusted return at the one year horizon is 
-2.05 instead of -2.34.
3  Second, the effect is large and significant both before and after 1990. 
B.  Calendar time 
Table IV reports calendar time portfolio returns for the one year horizon, showing both 
market adjusted returns and two other adjustment methods.  One should be cautious using 
calendar time returns here, since in the early years there are very few firms per month in the 
event portfolios, often only one.  As it turns out, calendar time and event time calculations give 
about the same answer.  The first column shows market adjusted returns.  For all events, market 
adjusted returns are -2.85 percent per month over the 257 months of the sample, slightly higher 
than Table III’s number.   
As shown in Table II, event firms tend to be growth firms, so it is important to test 
whether the return effect reflects only this fact.  The next column of Table IV shows 
characteristic adjusted returns which control for size, value, and momentum.  Following Daniel, 
Grinblatt, Titman, and Wermers (1997), it subtracts from the event firm return the return on a 
portfolio of firms matched on market equity, market-book, and prior one-year return quintiles (a 
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 total of 125 matching portfolios).
4  As expected, this adjustment decreases the magnitude of the 
effect, but the remaining effect is still strikingly large and significant.   
An alternate way to adjusted for value, size, and momentum is to calculate alpha’s from a 
factor regression.  The last column of Table IV reports intercepts from a four factor model where 
the factors are the market, size, and value as in Fama and French (1993), augmented with a prior 
year return factor as in Carhart (1997).
5  Again, after this risk adjustment, a large and significant 
effect remains.   
The last row of Table IV shows the value weight instead of equal weight returns.  Here 
the returns are somewhat less dramatic, though the effect is still substantial and statistically 
significant (it is significant for the two-sided hypothesis for the factor regression, and for the 
one-sided hypothesis for the market adjusted and characteristic adjusted means).  The fact that 
value weighting gives a smaller effect is consistent with the idea that smaller stocks are more 
difficult to short and thus can be more overpriced. 
Table V shows the coefficients from the four factor regressions.  Most notable are the 
coefficients on value and momentum factors.  For the value factor, the coefficient is 
insignificantly different from zero, suggesting that these firms’ returns do not behave much like 
other growth firm returns.  For the momentum factor, the coefficient is significant and negative, 
suggesting these firms returns are behaving like firms with negative momentum.  This finding is 
not surprising: these firms have falling prices during the 12 month post-event period in which 
these factor loadings are estimated, so one might expect their returns to be correlated with other 
firms with falling prices.  Table II showed that prior to the event, the firms had positive (not 
negative) momentum since their prior year returns were above median.  If one re-estimates the 
regression for the one month after the event (rather than the 12 months), one gets a positive 
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 loading on the momentum factor. So going into the event the firms have positive momentum, 
after the event they have negative momentum.   
In summary, event firms have extremely low subsequent returns that are not explained by 
value, size, or momentum, using either characteristic adjustment or factor models.  Event firms 
have returns are two to three percent lower than non-event firms.  
V.  Effect on shorting costs and short interest 
This section looks at direct evidence on the ability to short the event firms.  One measure 
of the cost and difficulty of shorting comes from the stock lending market.  While I do not have 
access to data on rebate rates in the stock lending market for the sample firms (these data are 
proprietary and generally go back only a few years), I can compare the sample with a list of high 
cost stocks provided in D’Avolio (2002).  He lists 35 firms with very high shorting cost in his 
sample of April 2000 – September 2001 (the annual shorting costs range from 10% to 79%).  In 
April 2000, there are 6647 valid firms in the CRSP database, so about 0.5% of the universe has 
very high shorting costs.  I compare his list to the firms in my sample with initial events between 
April 1999 (one year before his sample starts) to September 2001 (when his sample ends).  There 
are 36 firms in my sample during this period.  The overlap of the two groups consists of six 
firms; thus 16% of the event firms have very high shorting costs, a much higher rate than the 
0.5% in the general population of stocks.  It is clear that the probability of such a high degree of 
overlap is miniscule.  Thus the sample is much more expensive to borrow than a random sample 
of firms, consistent with the hypothesis that the sample firms are subject to short sale constraints.     
Other evidence comes from reported short interest for each stock.  Here, one lacks a 
natural null hypothesis to test.  Unlike the case of returns, where the natural null hypothesis is 
that post-event returns are unpredictable, it is difficult to tell simple by looking at the quantity of 
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 shorting whether the anti-shorting events have any effect.   
Figure 1 shows the average ratio of short interest to shares outstanding in event time.
6    
Six months prior to the event, the ratio is already elevated at around 5.5% (a level which is the 
78
th percentile relative to the universe of all stocks).   It rises steadily over time, peaking two 
months after the event at 10.7% (the 92
nd percentile), and remains roughly constant thereafter.  
One interpretation is that the rising level of short interest causes the firms to take the anti-
shorting actions. 
While it is difficult to interpret these results in the absence of a null hypothesis, it seems 
clear that something is happening around the event date, since the rapid rise in short interest 
halts.  In that sense, it could be that the anti-shorting actions are effective at stopping the growth 
of short interest.  On the other hand, the actions certainly do not cause the level of short interest 
to substantially and rapidly decrease.  Since one doesn’t know what short interest would have 
been in the absence of an anti-shorting event, it is impossible to draw solid inferences from this 
evidence. 
In summary, the anti-shorting firms are expensive to short, and there is a large increase in 
short interest prior to the event itself. 
VI.  Short squeezes 
This section examines in more detail the events where firms attempt to coordinate a short 
squeeze by asking their shareholders to withdraw shares from the stock loan market.  I focus on 
this event since it is the most common of the technical events designed to create a squeeze. 
Journalists and market participants often cite short squeezes as explanations for 
movements in stock, bond, and commodity markets.  One common definition is that a short 
squeeze occurs when the price of a security rises, causing the short sellers to experience a decline 
Go down fighting – Page 25 
 in net wealth.  Either because of lower wealth, increased risk aversion, fear of further price rises, 
or margin calls, the short seller then covers his position, increasing the demand for the security 
and driving the stock further up.  In contrast, the definition of a short squeeze used here is when 
a short seller is involuntarily forced to cover his short position because he is no longer able to 
borrow the security.  Most of the literature on short squeezes focuses on either theoretical issues 
or empirical findings in the bond, commodity, and derivative markets (for example Jarrow 1992, 
1994, Jegadeesh 1993, Kumar and Seppi 1992, Merrick, Naik, and Yadav 2002, Nyborg and 
Sundaresan 1996, and Pirrong 1993, 2001). D’Avolio (2002), using data from the stock lending 
market, finds little evidence for short squeezes in his 18 month sample. 
Wall Street wisdom suggests that high short interest stocks are good to own because they 
may rise due to a short squeeze.  According to this view, one should be willing to buy overpriced 
stock in anticipation of a short squeeze that will drive prices still higher.  An example of this idea 
is given in the case is GenesisIntermedia (which also illustrates direct manipulation in an attempt 
to enrich specific individuals).  On April 25, 2001, Chief Executive Ramy El-Batrawi sent a 
letter to shareholders asking them to contact their brokers and have shares put into cash accounts, 
making the shares unavailable for lending to short sellers.  Between April 25 and May 25, the 
stock rose 39%.  
GenesisIntermedia was 92% owned by a group of four insiders, including 45% owned by 
its chairman, Saudi financier and arms merchant Adnan Khashoggi (a central figure in the Iran-
Contra affair).  According to Hirsch (2001):  
"I think that after our chairman sent out his letter, our shareholders started to take 
possession of some of their shares, forcing the shorts to cover their positions," said 
Douglas Jacobson, the company's chief financial officer. "There also may be upward 
pressure on the stock from people seeing the letter and then buying in anticipation that 
the short squeeze will get more dramatic."  Indeed, Jacobson conceded that Khashoggi 
might be among those investors and might eventually sell shares to bring his holding 
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 closer to the third of the company he owned previously.  According to documents filed 
with the Securities and Exchange Commission, Khashoggi purchased more than 60,000 
shares at about $11.30 each since El-Batrawi's letter.  "It could end up being very good 
for him to have the shorts buy back shares from him," Jacobson said.  
 
There are 29 cases where firms attempt a coordinated loan withdrawal.  For the purposes 
of this section, I discarded five of these.  Two had event dates that were identified only by month 
(these events are reflected in the long term returns shown in section IV).  Three have no clear 
event date, since media reports simply mentioned that discouraging lending was a continuing 
policy of the firm (these events are reflected in the long term returns shown in section IV, with 
the event date set equal to observation date).  Of the remaining 24 cases, 22 were clearly public 
information that was available in real time, and in two cases the event was semi-private, and only 
appeared in the media subsequent to the event (these two cases are reflected in the long term 
returns shown in section IV, with the event date set equal to observation date).     
Before reviewing the evidence on these actions, it is instructive to consider how these 
events differ from other events typically studied in financial economics.  First, these events are 
not clean and exogenous.  Unlike, for example, earnings announcements, which come at pre-
announced and regular intervals, these events are entirely endogenous and occur partly in 
response to the level of stock prices.  Other news (including about other anti-shorting activities) 
may also be occurring in the same window.   Second, these events are not only information 
events, but also technical events reflecting the operations of the stock loan market.  In a world 
with frictions (as opposed to the standard assumption of frictionless and informationally efficient 
markets), it is not clear whether one would expect prices to immediately reflect the short 
squeeze, or to slowly respond as the squeeze is put in effect.  It presumably takes some time for 
investors, after receiving the suggestion, to contact their brokers to withdraw their shares from 
the loan market, and short sellers who have their loans withdrawn have several days to deliver 
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 the shares.  Last, the evidence will necessarily have a limited ability to measure the efficacy of 
anti-shorting actions.  It is hard to tell whether an anti-shorting action has any effect because one 
doesn’t know how much shorting there would be in the absence of action.  It could be that prices 
would have fallen faster if the action had not been taken.  All that can be said is that one can be 
fairly confident that the anti-shorting actions did not make life easier for short sellers. 
Figure 2 shows volume around event days (days are trading days, not calendar days).  
The volume is expressed as the percentile of exchange-adjusted turnover relative to the CRSP 
universe.  As shown in Table II, event firms tend to be high volume firms in general, and before 
the event the firms tend to be in the top quartile of turnover.  Volume spikes up on the event date, 
suggesting that something is indeed happening on that day.  Even with only 24 firms, this spike 
in volume on the event day is statistically significant.  D’Avolio (2002) reports that high recall 
days have extremely high trading volume, consistent with the event causing recall of stock loans.  
Of course, this spike does not prove that the anti-shorting action is causing volume to increase; it 
could be that the action is taken in response to higher volume or to some other unobserved event. 
Figure 3 shows cumulative average market adjusted returns around event days.  Since 
returns are so volatile and there are only 24 firms, standard errors are large, and one would need 
incredibly large mean returns in order to get statistical significance.  Figure 3 shows that 
cumulative returns are not incredibly large, and thus there is generally nothing in Figure 3 that is 
statistically significant.  Looking at the point estimates, there is some evidence that the actions 
do succeed in slightly raising prices temporarily.  Cumulative returns are 4.6 percent from day t-
5 to day t+5.  By day t+20, a month after the event, however, nothing much has changed.  The 
most notable feature of Figure 3 is the pre-event increase in returns, reflecting perhaps insider 
buying in anticipation of the squeeze, or perhaps other events.  Figure 3 also shows cumulated 
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 alpha’s from the Fama-French 3-factor model estimated on daily data, which are about the same 
as cumulated average market adjusted returns. 
Summarizing, these actions do not seem to have much ability to raise prices, although it 
could be that absent these events prices would have fallen more.  What is clear is that this ability, 
if it exists, is only temporary, and that long-term returns on these stocks are abysmal. 
VII.  Conclusion 
The evidence shows that when firms take anti-shorting actions, their stock returns are 
extraordinarily low over the subsequent months and years. The evidence confirms the hypothesis 
that short sale constraints allow stocks to become overpriced.  While the underperformance of -2 
per month is very large, it is similar in magnitude to the -1 to -10 range found in other studies of 
stocks with very high short sale constraints.    
  The 25 years of evidence studied here is valuable because of the difficulty of finding 
direct data on short sale constraints.  Jones and Lamont (2002) find data for six years (1926-
1933) while Lamont and Thaler (2003), and Ofek, Richardson, and Whitelaw (2003) studied data 
for a few years around the year 2000.  Each one of these four data sets has unique characteristics, 
and it is conceivable that any one result reflects chance or an unusual sample period.  But taken 
together, the evidence shows that in extreme cases where short sellers want to short a stock but 
find it difficult to do so, overpricing can be very large. 
What should an investor do if he sees a firm taking an anti-shorting action?  The evidence 
here cannot say whether it is a good idea to short this stock.  Although one can make large gross 
returns on average if one is able to maintain a short position for months, maintaining the short 
position might be difficult or expensive.  Even if there are no problems borrowing the stock, a 
short seller may need to spend time and money dealing with lawsuits and investigations.  It is 
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 unclear how these costs and benefits net out.  It is clear, however, that it is a bad idea in general 
to own stock in a firm that is taking these actions.  Investors seeking high returns should look 
elsewhere.   
The fact that firms take anti-shorting actions tells us that they must believe these actions 
are worth doing.  A substantial body of research studies whether firms opportunistically take 
advantage of mispricing by issuing equity when it is overpriced and buying it back when it is 
underpriced (for example Loughran and Ritter, 1995).  Corporate managers certainly say they are 
trying to time the market (Graham and Harvey, 2001).  However, it is usually difficult to 
discriminate between the hypothesis that firms are responding to rational changes in discount 
rates as opposed to over- or under-pricing (see for example Lamont (2000), Polk and Sapienza 
(2004)).  The anti-shorting actions studied here show that firms are not just passively responding 
to market signals, but are in fact actively trying to prop up their stock prices.  In this respect the 
phenomenon is similar to the evidence on earnings accruals, which can be interpreted as firms 
actively manipulating accounting numbers to cause overpricing.  Similarly, firms encourage 
analysts to issue optimistic forecasts, and reward optimistic analysts with investment banking 
business (see for example Michaely and Womack 1999). 
Although I interpret the evidence as consistent with short sales constraints causing 
overpricing, there are two alternative explanations of the results.  The first alternative 
explanation is that anti-shorting actions are a signal that insiders know that the firm is 
overvalued, so that the low returns reflect inside information instead of short sale constraints.  
While it is certainly true that anti-shorting actions may reveal negative inside information, this 
story does not explain why it takes so long for the information to be reflected in stock prices.  
With no frictions, the information should be immediately incorporated.  In contrast, short sale 
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 constraints provide an explanation for the slow reaction of prices to information.  Since the effect 
persists for years, the low returns are not primarily a short-term under-reaction to bad news.  
Rather, the low returns reflect persistent overpricing. 
A second alternative explanation, favored by the firms used in the sample, is that short 
sellers are actually manipulating prices, driving prices down over long periods of time.  The 
problem with this explanation is that many of the sample firms are subsequently revealed to be 
fraudulent.  Thus the short sellers are identifying firms having bad fundamental value.  This 
paper has presented a rogues gallery of shady characters, ranging from Charles Keating to Adnan 
Khashoggi.  In public battles between short sellers and firms, short sellers usually are vindicated 
by subsequent events.  The evidence suggests that short sellers play an important role in 
detecting not just overpricing, but also fraud.  Policy makers might want to consider making the 
institutional and legal environment less hostile to short sellers. 
Consider, for example, one episode from the sample.  In 1989 Congress held hearings 
about the evils of short selling, featuring testimony from supposedly victimized firms.  During 
the hearings, Congressman Dennis Hastert (later speaker of the US House of Representatives), 
described short selling as “blatant thuggery”.  But who was the victim and who was the thug?  
During the hearings, an SEC official testified that “many of the complaints we receive about 
alleged illegal short selling come from companies and corporate officers who are themselves 
under investigation by the Commission or others for possible violations of the securities or other 
laws.” (U.S. House of Representatives, 1991, Pages 434-435).  Officials from three firms 
testified.   Subsequent to this testimony, the presidents of two of these three firms were 
prosecuted for fraud (for the third firm, the SEC determined the company had made materially 
false and misleading statements, but that the evidence was insufficient to prosecute).
 7    More 
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 systematic evidence on this point comes from Dechow et al (1996), who study SEC enforcement 
actions for earnings manipulation, and Griffin (2003) who studies earnings restatements leading 
to shareholder lawsuits.  Both find that short interest rises surrounding these negative events, and 
starts to rise several months prior to the public announcement of bad news.  This evidence 
indicates that short sellers are able to anticipate bad news about earnings and identify fraud. 
Most firms do not take anti-shorting actions, and for most large cap stocks it is not 
difficult to sell short.  Thus one cannot conclude from the evidence that short sale constraints are 
pervasive phenomena in stock pricing.  What we do know is that for most stocks, very little short 
selling occurs (relative to other trading activity) and most investors never go short.  Thus 
something is constraining short selling, perhaps lack of knowledge about shorting, institutional 
constraints, risk, or cultural issues.  Generalizing from the narrow (but dramatic) evidence 
presented in this paper, one can speculate that these more general short sale constraints also 
affect stock prices. 
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ENDNOTES
                                                 
1 One complication is that these letters were not always reported in the media in real time (in the 
case of Solv-Ex, the February letter was not reported until August).  Thus sometimes these letters 
are semi-public information, known to large shareholders but not necessarily to all investors.  
When examining long-term returns, I use only completely public information (in section  VI, I 
look at event studies and consider the semi-public information as well).   
2 There are a small number of firms for which the event date is clear and occurs in a month prior 
to the observation date (the first time the event is mentioned in the media).  These firms are 
included in the long-term returns after the observation date, but the “first 12 months” is in 
reference to event date.  So if the event occurs in January and I observe it in March, it gets into 
long-term return portfolio in March but stays for only 10 months not 12.  The same holds true for 
firms which are not in CRSP in the event month but are subsequently added.  In cases where 
there is no well defined event date, I use the observation date for the event date.  To eliminate 
double counting, a firm only is reflected in a given average once in any given month.  For 
example, a firm is included in the all event calculation in month t if any event occurred in 
months t-12 to t-1. 
3 I plugged in the delisting return from CRSP into the monthly return sequence in the month after 
the last available regular return.  So if a firm delists in February, has the last monthly return in 
January, and CRSP records a delisting return in April, I plug that delisting return in for February.  
Following Shumway (1997), in the very few cases where no delisting return is available, I plug 
in -30%. 
4 These 125 portfolios are reformed every month based on the market equity, M/B ratio, and 
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prior year return from the previous month.  However, following Fama and French (1993), the 
M/B ratio is only updated annually in July, based on the value as of the previous December. 
5 I am grateful to Ken French for this data.  All four factors come from his web page. They are 
RMRF,  the excess market return, SMB (the return on small stocks minus big stocks) and the 
HML (the return of high book-market stocks minus low book-market stocks), and a price 
momentum factor, UMD (the return of stocks with high prior year returns minus stocks with low 
prior year returns). UMD is created by French and is slightly different from the factor 
constructed by Carhart (1997).  
6 The data on short interest is limited (from 1992 to 2001 for the NYSE, and from 1995 to 2001 
for NASDAQ) and data availability cuts the sample by more than half. 
7 The three firms, with citations to the subsequent SEC charges, were American City Business 
Journals (Wall Street Journal, 1991), Carrington Laboratories (U.S. House of Representatives, 
1991, p. 513), and IGI, Inc. (Wall Street Journal, 2002).  As mentioned in Section II, there are a 
total of eight firms involved in the Congressional hearings, but these were the only three in 
which company officials actually testified. 
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Table I 
Distribution of events 
 
The sample is firms which have at least one monthly return in the 12 months following the event.   
 
Description Comment  Number Number





Alleges lies  Lies/rumors/planting stories/inaccurate statements  125 125
Considering 
options 
Consider options or conducting investigation using outside 
counsel or private investigator  21 21
All belligerent   175 159
     
Requests 
investigation  
Requests investigation by authorities (usually SEC or 
exchange), or claims one is underway, or media reports 
that authorities are investigating shorters  66 66
Lawsuit   Announcement of lawsuit or of retraction based on litigation  35 35
All legal  All legal  101 98
     
Exchange 
switch 
exchange switch/seeking exchange switch 
66




CEO sets up system to buy own stock, or firm announces 
repurchase explicitly in response to shorters, Friendly 
owners withdraw shares from lending market, lending 
by firm to shareholders, or employee stock ownership 





All technical    51 43
     
All events    327 266
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Table II 
Characteristics of event firms (percentiles) in month prior to event 
 
Percentile variables in the month prior to event, compared to the universe of CRSP firms. For 
firms which do not have data for the month prior to the event, the characteristic is from the 
month preceding the first return observation.  Size is market equity.  M/B is market-book ratio 
(market value of equity divided by Compustat book value of equity).  The timing of M/B follows 
Fama and French (1993) and is as of the previous December year-end.  Volume is monthly 
turnover (volume divided by shares outstanding) minus the median turnover of all stocks on the 
same exchange.  Short interest ratio is the ratio of short interest to shares outstanding.  
 
 Number  ---------------------- Percentiles ---------------------- 
 Firms  Size M/B Volume Rt-12,t-1 Rt-1,t Short interest 
ratio 
Claims conspiracy  29 68  78 95  71  49  89 
Alleges lies  125 72  75  88  68 53  88 
Considering options  21 78  81 89  61  60  86 
All belligerent  159 72  76  89  67 52  88 
             
Requests investigation   66 67  81 85  69  58  86 
Lawsuit   35 60  84 86  56  49  92 
All legal  98  64  82  85  65  54  88 
             
Exchange switch  6 67  96  68 42  76  82 
Urge not lend   29 55  71 81  47  43  87 
Friendly owners  7 76  66  84 75  75  74 
Other technical  9 46  83  89 71  58  76 
All technical  43 56  77 81  56  52  81 
             
All events  266 67  77  87  64 53  86 
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Table III 
Market adjusted returns subsequent to events 
 
Average monthly market-adjusted returns in percent.  Market-adjusted returns are returns minus 
the return on the CRSP value weighted index.  The t-statistics, in parenthesis, use standard errors 
adjusted for the clustering of dates in calendar time. 
 
  One month  Three month One year  Three years  2 to 3 Years
  t to t+1  t to t+3  t to t+12  t to t+36  t+12 to t+36
              
Claims conspiracy  -2.64 (0.33) -2.28 (0.68) -4.37 (2.73) -2.77 (2.54) -1.63  (1.22)
Alleges lies  -1.62 (0.67) -2.08 (1.61) -1.71 (1.96) -1.31 (2.03) -1.06  (1.55)
Considering options  -5.10 (0.63) -8.19 (2.48) -5.79 (3.44) -2.76 (2.53) -0.82  (0.62)
All belligerent  -2.63 (1.00) -2.70 (2.08) -2.28 (2.86) -1.62 (2.73) -1.19  (1.93)
               
Requests investigation  -4.59 (1.52) -1.30 (0.66) -1.99 (2.17) -1.19 (1.73) -0.72  (0.81)
Lawsuit  -3.48 (1.15) -3.30 (1.03) -2.65 (1.72) -1.44 (1.48) -0.59  (0.48)
All legal  -4.22 (1.87) -1.89 (1.09) -2.24 (2.59) -1.31 (2.04) -0.73  (0.92)
               
Exchange switch  3.54 (0.47) -1.69 (0.38) 0.12 (0.06) -2.84 (2.37) -4.26  (2.95)
Urge not lend  -4.55 (1.00) -4.66 (1.82) -3.17 (1.65) -2.66 (2.29) -2.14  (1.54)
Friendly owners  -11.46 (0.87) -10.07 (1.66) -4.96 (1.90) 0.23 (0.07) 3.01  (0.60)
Other technical  -8.17 (1.35) -12.39 (2.93) -8.54 (2.61) -5.60 (2.23) -1.52  (0.40)
All technical  -3.86 (1.08) -5.19 (2.62) -2.66 (1.95) -2.04 (2.13) -1.50  (1.14)
               
All events  -3.09 (1.85) -2.58 (2.63) -2.34 (3.69) -1.48 (2.80) -0.89  (1.51)Go down fighting – Page 43 
 
Table IV 
Calendar time portfolio returns for one-year horizon returns 
 
Monthly returns in percent for the twelve months following an event, calculated using calendar 
time portfolios.  Portfolios are equal weighted except for last row, which is value weighted.  
Market adjusted returns are returns minus the return on the CRSP value weighted index.  
Characteristic adjusted are returns minus the returns on a value weighted portfolio of all CRSP 
firms in the same size, market-book, and one year momentum quintile.  Four-factor alpha is the 
intercept from a regression of returns in excess of t-bills on the three factors of Fama and French 
(1993), size, value, and market, plus a fourth price momentum factor similar to Carhart (1997).  
“N months” is the number of calendar months available for market adjusted returns (the number 










            
Claims conspiracy  166 -3.33 (2.22) -2.77 (2.05) -2.06 (1.32)
Alleges lies  229 -2.06 (2.22) -1.09 (1.32) -1.76 (1.79)
Considering options  125 -5.46 (3.37) -4.66 (3.05) -4.90 (2.91)
All belligerent  251 -2.26 (2.66) -1.36 (1.85) -1.94 (2.31)
            
Requests investigation  220 -2.67 (2.94) -2.04 (2.47) -2.11 (2.17)
Lawsuit   179 -3.07 (2.06) -1.95 (1.39) -2.93 (1.88)
All legal  241 -2.82 (3.32) -1.91 (2.48) -2.55 (2.89)
            
Exchange switch  53 0.58 (0.27) 1.32 (0.70) -0.83 (0.33)
Urge not lend   132 -4.52 (3.07) -4.55 (3.18) -4.00 (2.48)
Friendly owners  51 -4.69 (1.82) -3.15 (1.25) -6.95 (2.19)
Other technical  58 -8.81 (2.45) -7.26 (1.99) -9.93 (2.42)
All technical  180 -2.79 (2.36) -1.97 (1.87) -2.90 (2.33)
            
All events  257 -2.85 (4.32) -1.88 (3.41) -2.40 (3.81)
            
All events,  
value weighted  257 -1.31 (1.81) -1.23 (1.72) -1.95 (3.22)
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Table V 
Four factor regressions for one-year horizon returns 
 
Regression results using calendar time monthly returns in percent for the twelve months 
following an event.  Portfolios are equal weighted except for last row, which is value weighted.  
RMRF is returns on the CRSP value weighted portfolio minus T-bill returns.  HML is the value 
factor (the return of low M/B stocks high M/B stocks), SMB is the size factor (the return on 
small stocks minus big stocks), and UMD is the momentum factor (the return of stocks with high 
prior year returns minus stocks with low prior year returns).  T-statistics in parentheses. 
 
Description  α   RMRF  HML  SMB UMD  R2 
              
Claims conspiracy  -2.06 (1.32) 1.19 (3.07) -0.33 (0.60) 1.88 (3.93) -1.17 (2.89) 0.26
Alleges lies  -1.76 (1.79) 0.89 (3.48) -0.56 (1.52) 1.36 (4.32) -0.47 (1.77) 0.25
Considering options  -4.90 (2.91) 1.45 (3.95) 0.20 (0.31) 1.59 (2.91) -0.56 (1.07) 0.20
All belligerent  -1.94 (2.31) 1.23 (6.16) -0.42 (1.35) 1.53 (5.54) -0.58 (2.54) 0.36
                   
Requests investigation -2.11 (2.17) 1.31 (5.71) 0.00 (0.01) 0.75 (2.25) -0.79 (2.70) 0.23
Lawsuit   -2.93 (1.88) 0.73 (1.97) -0.60 (1.10) 1.58 (3.19) -0.37 (0.94) 0.16
All legal  -2.55 (2.89) 0.99 (4.73) -0.14 (0.42) 1.34 (4.63) -0.40 (1.69) 0.25
                   
Exchange switch  -0.83 (0.33) 1.59 (2.34) -0.07 (0.07) 1.95 (2.35) 0.79 (0.81) 0.22
Urge not lend   -4.00 (2.48) 0.86 (2.45) 0.25 (0.38) 1.28 (2.29) -0.45 (1.11) 0.15
Friendly owners  -6.95 (2.19) 2.73 (2.86) 1.51 (1.39) 1.79 (1.83) 0.43 (0.43) 0.19
Other technical  -9.93 (2.42) 2.71 (1.96) -2.08 (1.14) 0.81 (0.48) -0.67 (0.41) 0.17
All technical  -2.90 (2.33) 1.28 (4.40) 0.55 (1.10) 1.70 (4.05) -0.02 (0.05) 0.22
                   
All events  -2.40 (3.81) 1.06 (7.11) -0.34 (1.47) 1.50 (7.21) -0.55 (3.24) 0.44
              
All events,  
value weighted  -1.95 (3.22) 1.45 (10.19) 0.02 (0.09) 0.74 (3.75) -0.47 (2.89) 0.43
 Figure 1: Short interest ratio for all events 
 
The figure shows the monthly ratio of short interest to share outstanding, in event time.  Month 
zero is the first month that any anti-shorting event takes place for the firm. 
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 Figure 2: Volume for urge events 
 
The figure shows trading volume in event time.  Trading volume is measured as share turnover, 
and is expressed as percentile turnover relative to other stocks on the same day and in the same 
exchange.  Day zero is the trading day on which the first urge event occurs, where the firm urges 
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 Figure 3: Cumulative returns for urge events 
 
The figure shows cumulative returns in event time.  Market adjusted returns are returns minus 
the return on the CRSP value weighted index.  Three-factor alpha is the intercept from a 
regression of returns in excess of t-bills on the three factors of Fama and French (1993), size, 
value, and market. Day zero is the trading day on which the first urge event occurs, where the 
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